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The Establishment of Charter Schools: A Guide to 
Legal Issues for Legislatures 
By Jennifer T. Wall* 
I. INTRODUCTION TO CHARTER SCHOOLS1 
The newest concept in education reform is the charter 
school.2 Charter schools operate by charter or contract, between 
those responsible for making educational choices at the school 
level and the governmental entity designated by statute to ap-
prove charters. These schools seek greater autonomy in ex-
change for greater accountability to the local or state entity 
responsible for public education. The creation of charter schools 
is a varied process and each state has approached the challenge 
somewhat differently.3 As of November 1996, twenty-five states 
had passed legislation providing for the establishment of charter 
schools within the public school system,4 and estimates are that 
* B.A. Brigham Young University, 1992. J.D. Brigham Young University, 1997. 
Member, Utah Bar. Currently working in the United Kingdom for the University of 
Newcastle Centre for Family Studies, researching the implementation of the 1996 
Family Law Act. 
1. The term "charter schools" is the most widely-used and accepted term to 
describe this type of education reform founded on the principles of choice and autonomy. 
Charter schools are but one variety of choice reform efforts. They have been 
characterized as the "heart" of the choice reform theory because they make it possible 
for "someone other than school boards to set up and run public schools. • Charter 
Schools Free at Last, THE ECONOMIST, July 2, 1994, at 26. For a detailed discussion of 
the various other "choice" reforms, see Philip T.K. Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis of 
Educational Choice: Can the Polemic of Legal Problems Be Overcome? 43 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1, 10-25 (1993). 
2. Charter schools are part of a larger educational reform movement spurred by 
the 1983 National Commission on Excellence in Education report to Congress and the 
Secretary of Education, which served as an omen to the American people of a "rising 
tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people." See Nat'! 
Comm. on Excellence in Educ., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL 
REFORM 5 (1983). As a result, legislators, educators, and parents began to explore 
alternative methods of education to salvage the failing public school system. 
3. Charter Schools, ECS Clearinghouse Issue Brief, Jan. 1996, at 1. 
4. The National Charter School Directory, The Center for Education Reform, ECS 
Information Clearinghouse, (November 1996); According to the latest figures, the 
following states have charter legislation and schools in existence: Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
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nearly 300 schools have been established nationwide. 5 Charter 
schools are traditionally classified as "strong" or "weak," depend-
ing on the amount of autonomy granted to the schools, with 
strong laws allowing for greater autonomy and weak laws allow-
ing for little autonomy. Most charter schools have been estab-
lished under strong laws.6 
The purpose of this paper is to identify and examine the 
pertinent legal issues associated with the establishment of char-
ter schools. Compared with the vast range of information in 
existence, generally about charter schools, information on the 
legal issues is sparsely scattered throughout various policy 
briefs and reports by research institutes and other organiza-
tions. As state legislatures explore the possibility of drafting 
charter school legislation, they should be aware that the estab-
lishment of charter schools involves legal issues which must be 
addressed by express statutory language. These statutory provi-
sions require the school and the sponsoring entity to address the 
issues themselves in their individual contract with the charter 
school. 
Part II of this paper discusses issues of control, such as who 
has control over the educational process, and how the school is 
legally classified. Part III will then touch on several constitu-
tional issues that need to be addressed in state legislation. Part 
IV will address the issue of liability, including how liability has 
been allocated among the various suppliers in the charter school 
marketplace-the state, the school sponsors, the school direc-
tors, school employees and volunteers. Part V will discuss char-
ter revocation, including what responsibilities the school and 
state may have in the event that a charter is revoked mid-year. 
Part VI will examine whether the contractual nature of charter 
schools will lead to the development of litigation theories based 
on state constitution education clauses or contract law. Part VII 
concludes that the legal issues involved in the establishment of 
Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, Texas, 
and Wisconsin. Those states with charter legislation but with no charter schools in 
operation include: Arkansas, Connecticut, Kansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Wyoming. See also Connie L. Koprowicz, 
Charter School Update, 4 NCSL Legisbrief no. 30 (June/July 1996). 
5. Charter Schools, ECS Clearinghouse Issue Brief, Jan. 1996, at 1. 
6. Id. at 3. 
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charter schools should be carefully considered by state legisla-
tures in drafting or revising charter school laws. 
II. ISSUES OF CONTROL AND DEFINITION 
A. Divesting the State Board of Education of Control 
One of the most apparent issues involved in the establish-
ment of charter schools is the question of control: who or what is 
in control of the educational system. This question often stems 
from whether a charter school in a particular state is organized 
as a legally autonomous entity, or whether it remains under the 
control of a specific state entity. In general, states with strong 
laws tend to permit their charter schools to be legally autono-
mous, while states with weak laws tend to place their charter 
schools directly under the authority of a school board. 7 If a 
state constitution contains a provision granting general control 
and supervision of education to the state board of education, the 
issue of control takes on constitutional dimensions. The state 
board's constitutional right to supervise and control education 
needs to be reconciled with the allocation of control in the statu-
tory language creating charter schools. For example, if a state 
constitution dictates that the state board of education is to exer-
cise general control and supervision ofthe public education sys-
tem, then is charter school legislation unconstitutional if it 
transfers control and supervision to local school directors and 
teachers? In order to make charter school legislation constitu-
tional, how can the issue of the transfer of control and supervi-
sion from the states to the local school directors and teachers be 
addressed? 
The essence of the charter school reform effort is to place 
control over such decisions as curriculum, supplies, and teaching 
methods, in the hands of teachers, parents, and local school 
directors. In exchange, these individuals are required to account 
for the success of their school, as outlined by the specific terms 
7. Louann A. Bierlein & Lori A. Mulholland, Comparing Charter School Laws: 
The Issue of Autonomy, Policy Brief, The Morrison Institute for Public Policy, Arizona 
State University, (1994). Interestingly, the statistics show a definite correlation between 
the number of schools organized under a charter law and the amount of autonomy 
granted. States that grant broad authority are much more likely to have more charter 
schools operating under their laws. Education Reform: A Charter for Success?, STATE 
TRENDS-CRITICAL ISSUES, EMERGING TRENDS AND BEST PRACTICES IN STATE 
GoVERNMENTS, (The Council of State Gilvernments, Lexington, Ky.) Winter 1997, at 1. 
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of their charter. If too much control is relinquished to the local 
school, then the state board or other constitutionally-vested 
entity will no longer be exercising any control or supervision 
over public education. This relinquishment of control arguably 
violates the framework set out by the constitution. 
Already, several states have been compelled to defend their 
charter school legislation against challenges of unconstitutional-
ity. In Michigan, for example, a group of plaintiffs filed a lawsuit 
against the State of Michigan, various department heads, the 
board of education of a school district, and a proposed charter 
school, seeking to have the state's charter school legislation 
declared unconstitutional.8 One of the three issues raised in the 
litigation dealt with whether the act improperly divested the 
Michigan State Board of Education of its right and responsibil-
ity to lead and supervise public education. The plaintiffs argued 
that, by placing control in the hands of the school leaders, the 
legislation divested the state board of education of its constitu-
tional mandate to regulate the day to day operation of public 
schools. 
The Michigan Constitution, Article 8, Section 3,9 states: 
"Leadership and general supervisiOn over all public 
education ... is vested in a state board of education. It shall 
serve as the general planning and coordinating body for all pub-
lic education ... and shall advise the legislature as to the finan-
cial requirements in connection therewith." Although the court 
recognized that Article 8, Section 3 is not an exclusive grant of 
all power of control over public education to the Michigan State 
Board of Education, it held that the act "usurps the authority of 
the state board of education to oversee and supervise public 
education in Michigan and places that authority in the hands of 
other institutions. This violates Article 8, Section 3, and makes 
this Act unconstitutional on its face."10 The court held that Michi-
gan's charter school law violated the Michigan Constitution 
because "academy" schools were not "public schools" under 
Michigan law and because the power of the Michigan State 
Board of Education to supervise public education had been 
8. Council of Organizations and Others for Education about Parochiaid, Inc., v. 
John Engler, No. 94-78461-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 1, 1994). 
9. MICH. CONST. Art. VIII, § 3. 
10. /d. 
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usurped by other institutions.11 Key to the court's holding was 
its determination that Section 3 meant that the state was to 
have exclusive control over education. On appeal, this conclu-
sion was upheld in a rather short opinion.12 Michigan's constitu-
tional provision is not unique in granting control to a state 
board of education.13 As of 1997, Michigan was the only state to 
have faced a constitutional challenge on this particular issue. 
Other states have managed to side-step this issue through care-
ful drafting. 14 
Related to the issue of control are the issues of accountability 
and evaluation. Once control has been delegated, a state must 
be able to monitor the quality of education delivered and take 
appropriate steps against accountable parties should it become 
necessary. In a draft report by the Hudson Institute, which be-
gan an extensive research project on charter schools in the sum-
mer of 1995, experts on charter schools gave their tentative 
impressions after having completed one-third of their first year's 
research. Regarding the issue of accountability, they noted: 
We have yet to see a single state with a thoughtful and well-
formulated plan for evaluating its charter school program. 
Perhaps this is not surprising, given the sorry condition of 
most state standards-assessment-accountability-evaluation 
systems generally. The problem, however, is apt to be particu-
larly acute for charter schools, where the whole point is to 
11. MrcH.CoNST. Art. VIII, § 3. 
12. Council of Organizations and Others for Education About Parochiaid v. 
Governor of Michigan, 548 N.W.2d 909 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (O'Connell, J., dissenting). 
13. For example, Utah's Constitution reads: "The general control and supervision 
of the public education system shall be vested in a State Board of Education." UTAH 
CONST. art. X § 3. This provision clearly places the general authority to control and 
oversee state education with the State Board. Charter school legislation in this state 
would need to be drafted carefully, allowing the state board to exercise its constitutional 
right to general control and supervision, while also allowing for the requisite autonomy 
that characterizes and empowers the charter school reform movement. 
14. See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-3(a) (West 1989) ("The board of trustees, 
upon receiving a charter from the commissioner [of Education], shall be deemed to be 
public agents authorized by the State Board of Education to supervise and control the 
charter school."); MINN. STAT. § 120.064(Subd. 7) (Supp. 1995) ("A charter school is a 
public school and is part of the state's system of public education."); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 72-1903 (Supp. 1995) ("It is the intention of this act to provide an alternative means 
within the public school system for ensuring accomplishment of the necessary outcomes 
of education by offering opportunities ... to establish and maintain charter school 
programs that operate within a school district structure, but independently from other 
school programs of the district."). 
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deliver better results in return for greater freedom. Policy 
makers will want to know whether this is actually happen-
ing[.]ls 
In their later report entitled "Charter Schools in Action: What 
Have We Learned?", the researchers conclude that "[s]tate char-
ter laws are stronger on theory than practice when it comes to 
accountability and evaluation. No state yet has in place a fully 
satisfactory plan, though several are making good progress."16 In 
the researchers' opinion, a well-functioning accountability sys-
tem includes "clearly delineated content and performance stan-
dards; exams that mirror those standards; timely, understand-
able, and comparable results, including academic and nonaca-
demic indicators of success; and real stakes for all.'117 Nearly 
every state has accountability procedures in place, yet these are 
usually described as procedures to be followed should revocation 
of a charter be necessary. The various aspects of charter school 
laws, including revocation procedures, are summarized in a 
report entitled "Charter Schools Laws Across the United 
States.''18 It appears that more work needs to be done regarding 
the issue of accountability to the sponsoring state entity. 
B. Classification of Charter Schools as Public Schools 
Another issue involved in the establishment of charter 
schools is their legal classification. Some statutes expressly cate-
gorize charter schools as public schools, while others character-
ize them as nonprofit organizations. Still others have used the 
15. Chester E. Finn, Jr. et a!., Charter Schools in Action: A First Look, DRAFT 
REPORT, Hudson Institute, January 1996. 
16. Chester E. Finn, Jr. et al, Charter Schools in Action: What Have We Learned, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, The Hudson Institute, July 1996. While the authors do not cite 
which states are making progress nor the nature of their progress, one state in 
particular, New Jersey, contains a provision which has the effect of increasing 
accountability to parents and other concerned individuals. The law allows individuals 
or groups to bring a complaint to the board of trustees alleging a violation of the 
Charter Schools Act. If dissatisfied with the board's decision, they may appeal to the 
education commissioner, who is to investigate and respond to the complaint. In 
addition, an advisory grievance committee comprised of teachers and parents (who have 
been selected by the teachers and parents) may make non-binding recommendations to 
the board concerning the resolution of the complaint. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 18A:36A-15 
(Supp. 1995). 
17. Id. 
18. Sandra Vergari & Dr. Michael Mintrom, Charter Schools Laws Across the 
United States, lNST. FOR PuB. POL 'y & Soc. RES., Mich. St. U., 1995. 
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title "school district" in order to allow the schools certain bene-
fits under the law, such as state funding. The various options 
represent the efforts of state legislatures to classify the schools 
so that they can exist both legally and functionally. However, 
legislatures should realize that it is not enough to merely cate-
gorize charter schools correctly in order to avoid a constitutional 
violation. The classification of charter schools must satisfy con-
stitutional requirements as a matter of fact. In other words, the 
charter school must, in fact, function as a public school in order 
to withstand a state constitutional challenge. 
Several states have already confronted this issue. In the 
Michigan lawsuit Council of Organizations and Others for Edu-
cation about Parochiaid Inc., u. Engler discussed supra/9 the 
first legal question raised was whether charter schools were 
public schools for which state funding was available. Michigan's 
Constitution Article 8, Section 2 prohibits the funding of private 
schools by the State.20 The Legislature had labeled the schools 
"public," but the Court recognized that "the fact that the Legisla-
ture attempts to define terms to meet constitutional muster will 
not, in and of itself, save a statute from being constitutionally 
unsound."21 In ruling on this issue, the Michigan court relied on 
previous case law and on an attorney general opinion that to-
gether provided a test for determining whether a school is public 
or private. Going beyond the determination of whether the 
schools were more public than private, the court determined 
that the rule in Michigan for a public school is that it must be 
"under the immediate, exclusive control of the state to pass con-
stitutional muster, as well as being open to all students that 
care to attend."22 In its application of this test, the court consid-
ered various characteristics of the Michigan charter school. 23 In 
determining that charter schools, as organized, were more pri-
vate in nature, the court explained its foremost concern: 
Who or what entity controls the operation of the school? Where 
the ultimate control of the school lays partially in private 
hands and partially with the public, it is this Court's opinion 
19. 548 N.W.2d at 911. 
20. Mich. Const. art. VIII § 2. 
21. Council of Orgs. and Others for Educ. about Parochiaid, Inc., v. John Engler, 
No. 94-78461-AW, at 4 (Cir. Ct. County of Ingham 1994) (order granting injunction). 
22. !d. 
23. !d. at 6-9. 
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that the school violates Article 8, Section 2. Where as here, 
substantial, if not most, of the control of the academy is placed 
beyond the hands of the public, the Constitution has been vio-
lated.24 
From the Michigan case we learn that depending on how the 
constitutional powers of a state board are construed and inter-
preted, statutory classification of a charter school as "public," 
combined with general oversight, may not be enough to meet 
constitutional muster. 
Michigan's experience highlights potential concerns for other 
states. To avoid potential legal problems relating to issues of 
control, drafters of charter legislation need to make charter 
schools part of the public education system, both in the language 
of the legislation and in the substance of the statutory scheme. 
Drafters must also make it clear in the legislation, by express 
language and in substance, that charter schools fall under the 
supervision and general control of the state board of education 
(or other constitutionally mandated body vested with the au-
thority to supervise and control public education). To ensure the 
legislation's constitutionality, the careful drafter should include 
procedures which ensure the charter schools' accountability to 
the state board of education. It is difficult to say what liability 
the state may incur if the legislation lacks such language. But 
one thing is certain, if a constitutional provision grants general 
control and supervision to the state board of education, the 
structure of charter schools as set up by the legislature cannot 
undermine that authority, or a constitutional challenge to the 
act would be appropriate. The drafters of legislation providing 
for charter schools need to be careful that the rhetoric used is 
consistent with state educational policy and state constitutional 
interpretation. 25 
Massachusetts has also dealt with the question of how to 
classify its charter schools. In a complaint filed with the Supe-
rior Court Department of the Trial Court, residents and taxpay-
24. Council of Orgs. and Others for Educ., at 9; aff'd, 548 N.W.2d 909 (1996). 
25. Peter J. Perla, The Colorado Charter Schools Act and the Potential for 
Unconstitutional Applications Under Article IX, Section 15 of the State Constitution, 67 
U. COLO. L. REV. 171, 188 (1996) (discussing possible unconstitutional aspects of 
Colorado's Charter Schools Act, including the divestment of the state board of education 
of its "constitutionally prescribed powers."). 
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ers of the Town of Marblehead alleged that the statutory scheme 
did not provide for the establishment of public schools, but in-
stead set up a system of private schools funded by public monies. 
The plaintiffs urged that the statutory scheme was forbidden by 
the Anti-Aid Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution.26 
Among other allegations, they alleged 1) that the statutory 
scheme did not provide for public accountability, which was a 
violation of Article V, Section 1 of the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion, 2) that the authority delegated to the Secretary of Educa-
tion was "an improper delegation oflegislative authority," and 3) 
and that the regulations thus promulgated by the secretary 
were invalid. At the crux of the complaint was the basic argu-
ment that these schools were labeled public by the legislature, 
but that they were in fact private schools that should not receive 
public monies. The complaint was dismissed at the trial court 
level,27 yet the arguments raised suggest some of the issues that 
should be examined by a legislature in considering charter 
school legislation. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
A. Establishment Clause Concerns 
Another issue in the establishment of charter schools in-
volves separation of church and state.28 This issue is not new to 
charter schools, as is evidenced by the wealth of literature on 
the issue, and by the long string of litigation dealing with the 
appropriate relationship between state schools and religion. 29 
26. MAss. CONST. amend. art. XVIII. 
27. The trial court judge refused to issue an injunction against charter schools. 
In so doing, he balanced the likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed in their lawsuit 
against the hann the defendants would suffer if he granted the request. His conclusion 
to deny the request for injunction was influenced by the judge's consideration of the 
public interest; had he granted it, approximately 3,000 students enrolled in various 
charter schools statewide would have been without schools the following autumn, and 
the teachers and staff would have been unemployed. The lawyer for the plaintiffs, Carl 
D. Goodman, insists that ultimately, the allegations in the complaint will reach the 
Supreme Judicial Court. See Charting a Revolution: A Lawyer/Parent In Marblehead 
Takes On The New Charter School Concept, MAss. LAW. WKLY., July 24, 1995 at Bl. As 
of April, 1997, no further action has been taken on this issue in Massachusetts. 
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
29. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 
388 (1983); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Public Education and 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971); See generally, David Futterman, Note, 
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Charter schools which are created out of existing public 
schools pose little immediate threat of an establishment clause 
violation, yet even these schools should be required to remain 
nonsectarian. Schools formed by private organizations and indi-
viduals pose more of a concern to state legislatures,30 and thus 
some states have allowed only existing public schools to convert 
to charter status.31 Government entanglement with religion is 
an important issue in school law and policy. Fortunately this 
issue has been regularly and adequately addressed by charter 
schoollegislation.32 
Until recently, it appeared that the threatened concern of 
educational litigation over establishment clause violations in 
the charter school context was more speculative worrying than 
School Choice and the Religion Clauses: The Law and Politics of Public Aid to Private 
Parochial Schools, 81 GEO. L.J. 711, 725-33 (1993); Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment 
Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An Update," 75 CALIF. L. REV. 5 (1987); 
Developments in the Law: Religion and State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606 (1987); John E. 
Nowak, The Supreme Court, the Religion Clauses and the Nationalization of Education, 
70 Nw. L. REV. 883 (1976). 
30. The scenario of a state "contracting with a religious group for the purposes 
of secular instruction in a secular school" raises a new "Establishment Clause dilemma: 
can a municipality contract with a religious organization for the delivery of secular 
education in the public schools?" William D. Anderson, Jr., Note, Religious Groups in 
the Education Marketplace: Applying the Establishment Clause to School Privatization 
Programs, 82 GEO. L.J. 1869, 1875 (1994). 
31. While it appears that a number of states have chosen the option of limiting 
participation in charter school reform to existing public schools, other more progressive 
legislatures, like that in Wisconsin, have allowed private schools as well as public 
schools to join the charter reform movement. Wisconsin is the first state to have 
included parochial schools in its "choice" program. See WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (1996). 
Programs like the MPCP in Milwaukee are clearly susceptible to establishment clause 
violations. Wisconsin's effort to include parochial schools in school choice legislation has 
been followed by Ohio. PATHBREAKING SCHOOL CHOICE ENACTED IN Two STATES, THE 
CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM, PRESS RELEASE, June 6, 1995, at 1. Legal scholars 
and others closely following school reform efforts predict that these laws will eventually 
end up before the Supreme Court. See Joe Price, Educational Reform: Making the Case 
for Choice, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL 'y & L. 435, 467 (1996). 
32. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47602 (West 1993) ("No charter shall be granted 
under this part that authorizes the conversion of any private school to a charter 
school."); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 22-30.5-104(1) (1995) ("A charter school shall be a public, 
nonsectarian, nonreligious, non-home-based school which operates within a public school 
district."); MINN. STAT. § 120.064 (Subd. 8) (c) (Supp. 1995) ("A charter school must be 
nonsectarian in its programs, admission policies, employment practices, and all other 
operations. A sponsor may not authorize a charter school or program that is affiliated 
with a nonpublic sectarian school or a religious institution."); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 
71 § 89 (West 1996) ("Private and parochial schools shall not be eligible for charter 
school status."). The push for private charter schools is real; school choice advocates 
strongly encourage the inclusion of private schools as a way to improve the overall 
effectiveness of the reform movement. See Price, supra note 32, at 462. 
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legitimate threat. However, in the case of Stark v. Independent 
School District No. 640,33 the Establishment Clause was the 
central issue and the case poses interesting implications for the 
charter school movement.34 In Stark, the plaintiff "taxpayers" 
sought a declaration that the creation and operation of the Vesta 
school, opened at the request of a religious order called the 
Brethren,35 violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment and Article I, Section 16 of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion.36 The defendant school district argued that the Vesta school 
was a public school that simply was accommodating the reli-
gious beliefs of the parents and students attending the school.37 
The district court held that both the decision to open and the 
manner of operation of the Vesta school violated the Establish-
ment Clause.38 In so holding, the court relied on Lemon v. 
Kurtzman39 and its three-part test as a "guideline," although 
acknowledging that the status of the Lemon test "as a general 
purpose tool for administering the Establishment Clause is in 
doubt"40 and that the test is not consistently nor regularly ap 
33. 938 F. Supp. 544 (D. Minn. 1996). 
34. Perhaps fittingly, Minnesota is the first state to litigate this issue, since it is 
regarded as the trailblazer in the charter refonn movement and was the first state to 
enact charter legislation in 1991. The National Charter School Directory, Rev. Ed., THE 
CENTER FOR EDUCATION REFORM, (Education Commission of the States), November 1, 
1996, at 1. 
35. The school was organized after a petition made by a leader of the Brethren 
to the school district, and an agreement was reached on October 12, 1993 in which 
Paskewitz, the leader of the Brethren, would provide and lease a building to the school 
district free of charge and all maintenance, and the school district in return would 
provide the teacher and the necessary classroom materials and establish the curriculum. 
Also pursuant to the agreement, the school district would limit the use of technology 
in the classroom. 938 F. Supp. at 547. 
36. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect 
or support any place of worship, ... or any preference be given by law to any religious 
establishment or mode of worship ... "). 
37. 938 F. Supp. at 546. According to the court's findings, the Brethren consist 
of a group of people "who possess similar beliefs, one such belief being the general 
objection to the use of technological devices, such as computers, television, films and 
other modern technology and media." Additionally, the group practices "separatist and 
anti-mixing beliefs" by not eating meals with persons who do not share their beliefs. 
Historically, Brethren children attending public school required a separate table at 
lunchtime to allow the children to practice their separatist beliefs. At 547. 
38. Id. at 554 ("Based on the above, the Court finds that the creation and 
operation of the Vesta school violates the mandates of the First Amendment's 
Establishment Clause as well as the Article I, Section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution, 
by advancing religion."). 
39. 403 u.s. 602 (1971). 
40. 938 F. Supp. at 549, citing Shennan v. Community Consolidated School 
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plied.41 The District Court found that the facts supported "a 
clear example of state sponsorship, or the advancement, of a 
religion which violates the mandates of the First Amend-
ment .... "42 The school district had crossed the line between 
accommodation43 of religion and unlawful fostering of religion. 
The court agreed with the plaintiffs that a school district "can-
not open a school nor modify its curriculum based solely on the 
request of a religious group."44 In addition, the court found that 
the primary effect of the school district's decision to open the 
school per the Brethren's requests was that of promoting reli-
gion. 45 In sum the court found that the facts underlying the 
opening and operation of the Vesta school "'convey[] a message 
of government endorsement ... of religion' that violates a core 
purpose of the Establishment Clause."46 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit reversed the district court and held that the Vesta 
District 21 of Wheeling Township, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing U.S. Supreme 
Court cases in which Lemon called into doubt); Board of Education of Kiryas Joel 
Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (O'Connor, J. concurrence calling 
into doubt the use of a single test on a constitutional principle that operates differently 
in different contexts) (Scalia, J. joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J. dissenting, 
arguing that the Lemon test should be replaced). 
41. Stark, 838 F. Supp. at 549. Lemon has not been overruled, yet the Supreme 
Court has decided many cases without using the test. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577 (1992) (finding government involvement with religious activity so pervasive to 
the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious activity, that it was 
unnecessary to apply, or reconsider Lemon). 
42. 938 F. Supp. at 550. 
43. The basic thrust of the accommodation argument is that "the government may 
(and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without 
violating the Establishment Clause." Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (quoting 
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987). 
44. 938 F. Supp. at 551, (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), Pratt 
v. Ind. School Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982), and Edwards v. Aguillard, 
482 U.S. 578 (1987) as standing for the principle that "the School District cannot tailor 
its curriculum for the sole purpose of conforming to religious beliefs."). 
45. 938 F. Supp. at 553 (''What the School District has done is create an 
impermissible identification of its powers and duties with the religious beliefs of the 
Brethren by agreeing to open the Vesta school in a building owned by a Brethren 
member, and in the manner expressed by the Brethren. The fact that no religion is 
taught at the school does not affect the constitutional violation in this case. Government 
promotes religion as effectively when it fosters a close identification of its powers and 
responsibilities with those of any-<>r-all religious denominations as when it attempts 
to inculcate specific religious doctrines. If this identification conveys a message of 
government endorsement or disapproval of religion, a core purpose of the Establishment 
Clause is violated."). 
46. Id. 
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School violated neither the First Amendment of the U.S. Consti-
tution nor Article I, Section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution.47 
The court identified the applicable test as the three-prong 
Lemon test.48 By focusing on the facts present in the record, the 
court concluded that "neither the decision to open the Vesta 
school nor the district's application of the exemption policies 
fails the Lemon test. Both actions had a secular purpose and did 
not have the primary effect of advancing religion or endorsing 
the Brethren's religious beliefs."49 The Eighth Circuit also evalu-
ated the school district's actions under the "endorsement test"50 
and found no violation.51 In a similar manner, the appellate 
court found no violation of the Establishment Clause of the Min-
nesota Constitution: "As shown above, no religious instruction 
takes place at the Vesta school, and there is no expenditure of 
public funds in support of the teaching or promulgating of reli-
gious beliefs."52 
Although the case was reversed at the appellate court level, 
the reasoning employed by both courts is nevertheless instruc-
tive to educational lawyers and legislators. A careful reading of 
Stark v. Independent School District makes it clear that litiga-
tion over Establishment Clause violations can be extremely 
unpredictable and expensive for all parties, and that states 
should be prepared. Utah, for example, places tremendous im-
portance on the separation of church and state as a result of its 
unique history.53 Absent careful drafting, the establishment of 
charter schools in Utah could ignite a debate over the potential 
entanglement of religion in the public schools. Utah's Constitu-
tion Article X, Section 8, which prohibits public aid to church 
schools clearly states: "Neither the state of Utah nor its political 
47. 123 F. 3d 1068 (1997), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 
34122 (8th Cir, Nov. 24, 1997). 
48. 123 F.3d at 1073. 
49. Id. at 1075. 
50. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 
(1994). 
51. 123 F.3d at 1077. 
52. Id. 
53. Utah is well known for the large percentage of its population who are 
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). Having led the 
settlement and early government of the territory, the Church played an important role 
in Utah's bid for statehood. As a pre-condition for Utah's obtaining statehood, the 
Church was forced to relinquish its control of all aspects of state government, including 
the public education system. 
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subdivisions may make any appropriation for the direct support 
of any school or educational institution controlled by any reli-
gious organization." Given a constitutional provision like Utah's, 
if a state were to allow for the establishment of charter schools, 
drafters should include an express provision in the statutory 
language emphasizing that charter schools are not to be run or 
supported by any religious institutions or organizations. This is 
because charter schools, in order to receive funding from the 
state, must remain public and abide by the constitutional re-
quirements of the state. This may influence the legislature's 
decision of whether to allow private schools with sectarian ties 
to apply for charter status. 
To ensure compliance with a separation of church and state 
provision, the legislature should expressly declare that all char-
ter schools shall be free from sectarian control, and then allow 
private schools to convert to charter status. In the alternative, 
the legislature may decide to limit the range of possible appli-
cants to public schools already in existence at the time the char-
ter legislation is passed. While this option may prevent some 
individuals who wish to gain charter status for their school from 
receiving state funds, it may protect the integrity of the state's 
policy of non-sectarian schools as well as prevent future consti-
tutional challenges. 
B. Other Constitutional Challenges 
The establishment of charter schools may give rise to equal 
protection and due process challenges. A legislature would be 
wise to include in their legislation provisions which expressly 
require the school to abide by the laws of the state constitution 
and other federal statutory laws that cannot be waived, such as 
employment discrimination or sexual harassment. Most of these 
issues can be easily resolved by including in the statutory provi-
sions language which requires charter schools to abide by the 
non-waivable laws of federal and state statutes and constitu-
tions. This can either be done by listing the statutes outright in 
the charter school legislation, or by a clause in the legislation 
that encompasses the principle generally. 
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An interesting example of litigation involving these types of 
legal issues arose in Colorado, in Villanueva v. Carere.54 In 
Villanueva, the plaintiffs challenged Colorado's Charter Schools 
Act on six different grounds, citing violations of various federal 
statutes, and constitutional provisions such as equal protection 
and due process. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged the clos-
ing of two public elementary schools and opening of a charter 
school in their stead on six grounds: 
( 1) the decisions violate Plaintiffs' rights to equal protection of 
the laws pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution; (2) the Charter Schools Act, fa-
cially and as applied, violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the United States Constitution; (3) the decisions violate Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.; (4) 
the school closures would deprive Plaintiffs' rights to due pro-
cess of law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment by depriv-
ing them of (a) school wide Chapter I benefits, (b) the federally 
funded follow through program (PRAISE), and (c) school lunch 
and breakfast programs; (5) the opening of PSAS violates the 
Equal Education Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.; 
and (6) the closure of the elementary schools violates the Ele-
mentary and Secondary School Improvement Act Amend-
ments, 20 U.S.C. § 2726, by burdening parental involvement 
and endangering federal funds contingent upon such involve-
ment.55 
The district court found all the issues in the defendants' favor, 
denied the plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction, dis-
missed the complaint, and ordered that summary judgment be 
granted for the defendants.56 The court found that the plaintiffs 
had not established the requisite intent to discriminate in clos-
ing the regular schools or in opening the charter school required 
to support its equal protection claim. The court also found that 
the state had a legitimate governmental interest in encouraging 
innovation in education and that the Charter Schools Act was 
rationally related to that interest, which satisfied the due pro-
cess claim. 57 
54. 873 F. Supp. 434 (D. Colo. 1994), aff'd, 85 F.3d 481 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
55. 873 F. Supp. 434, 437. 
56. Id. at 452. 
57. Id. at 446, 450-52. 
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IV. ALLOCATION OF LIABILITY 
Any time a new organization, corporation or entity is set up, 
questions of liability arise. Charter schools are no exception. 
Traditionally, school districts, teachers, administrators and 
schools enjoy governmental immunity for their actions and deci-
sions in the absence of a statute to the contrary.58 A charter 
school differs from traditional public schools in that its directors 
and employees have been granted permission to make important 
decisions regarding the educational program and policies of the 
school. Thus, traditional notions of respondeat superior have 
been altered to the effect that these individuals appear much 
more like independent contractors than agents of the state. 
How should liability be allocated between the school direc-
tors and the school sponsor? Do they retain the characteristics of 
current local school boards, or would they be held personally 
liable? Is the school to receive governmental immunity? In other 
words, to whom or how far does governmental immunity extend? 
When charter school legislation is drafted, legislators need to 
address the issue of liability in the legislation itself. If they so 
choose, they can leave the specifics up to the bargaining process 
between the state sponsoring entity and the petitioning school.59 
States have dealt, to varying extents, with the issues of lia-
bility and accountability in their charter school statutes, yet 
treatment in statutory language has in no way been consistent. 
Also, because charter schools have only existed since 1991 and 
have met and exceeded expectations, there has been very little 
case law or litigation in the area.6° Considering that charter 
58. 57 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 42 
(1988). 
59. Regardless of how liability is allocated, the state and its board of education 
may feel compelled to intervene in a lawsuit, especially if constitutional issues are 
being litigated. Such was the case in Colorado, where both the State of Colorado and 
the Colorado State Board of Education intervened to defend the constitutionality of the 
Charter Schools Act, and thus ended up parties to the litigation, although the plaintiffs 
originally sued just the members of the local school board that voted to approve the 
closing of the two schools and the opening of the charter school. Villanueva v. Carere, 
873 F. Supp. 434 (D. Colo. 1994), aff'd, 85 F.3d 481 (lOth Cir. 1996). Sometimes even 
the threat of litigation may be enough to cause a state to think twice about the wisdom 
of changing the educational status quo. 
60. Of the more than twenty states that have enacted legislation establishing 
charter schools, only two, Michigan and Colorado, have been obliged to litigate its 
constitutionality. A third state, Massachusetts, saw a complaint filed but it was 
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statutes vary considerably by state and the charters themselves 
vary from charter to charter, each individual contract may an-
swer the questions of liability and accountability in a different 
way. Thus, uniform answers are not easily found. The answer to 
whether a state entity may face liability for the actions or fail-
ure of a charter school may ultimately depend on the terms of 
the contract between the government entity and the charter 
school itself.61 This is because the legislature can choose to let 
the contracting parties-the sponsoring state entity and the 
petitioning school-make the choice. Alternatively, the legisla-
ture can make the choice by statute and require the parties to 
work out the details within those limits. A state can insulate 
itself from liability by requiring that the school and the sponsor-
ing entity place terms to that effect in their contract, or the state 
may allocate liability for acts and omissions directly to the 
school directors by statute. 
A Statutory Solutions to Liability, Immunity, and Insurance 
Issues62 
Legislation from the various states allowing charter schools 
show how legislatures have dealt with the issues of immunity 
and liability. Unfortunately, statutes which authorize the estab-
lishment of charter schools often incompletely address the liabil-
dismissed. 
61. Allowing each charter school to negotiate its own contract could create 
inconsistencies for the state as well as the educators in knowing for which decisions 
they may be liable, and for which ones they may claim immunity. Also, based on the 
very same conduct, one school may be held accountable and the other indemnified, 
which fosters inconsistencies in the law and frustrates parties' expectations. Arguably, 
however, the relative bargaining power between the state or local school board and the 
trustees of the various charter schools will remain relatively predictable, because the 
statute itself will determine to a great extent the content of the charters granted by the 
state board. Even if the statute allows room for negotiation, the district or state board 
is likely to deal evenhandedly and consistently with all schools and require that it be 
absolved from liability in all of its charter school contracts, or likewise, it may choose 
to grant governmental immunity to all of those schools it chooses to charter. 
62. In examining statutory solutions, twelve states were selected-six granting 
broad autonomy to charter schools and six granting little autonomy. The following 
"broad autonomy" state statutes were examined (followed by the year charter legislation 
was adopted): Arizona (1994), California (1992), Colorado (1993), Michigan (1993), 
Minnesota (1991) and New Jersey (1996). Those statutes examined which granted little 
autonomy included: Georgia (1993), Hawaii (1994), Kansas (1994), New Mexico (1993), 
New Hampshire (1995), and Wyoming (1995). 
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ity issues that could be raised regarding these schools, especially 
the issue ofliability insurance. 
Some states grant varying degrees of immunity to sponsor-
ing entities. For example, Arizona' statute contains a provision 
which immunizes the school district governing board from liabil-
ity for acts and omissions of the charter schools it sponsors: 
A school district governing board and its agents and employees 
are not liable for any acts or omissions of a charter school that 
is sponsored by the school district, including acts or omissions 
relating to the application submitted by the charter school, the 
charter of the charter school, the operation of the charter 
school and the performance of the charter school. 63 
Another Arizona provision, equally as expansive, grants immu-
nity to those sponsors of a charter school besides a school district 
governing board: "A sponsor other than a school district govern-
ing board, including members, officers and employees of the 
sponsor, are immune from personal liability for all acts done and 
actions taken in good faith within the scope of their authority 
during duly constituted regular and special meetings."64 Instead 
of using a reasonableness standard or some kind of objective 
basis, the statute adopts a subjective good faith standard. As 
with any subjective standard, uncertainty is infused throughout 
the system. Upon review of a sponsor's or employee's actions, a 
court would have to inquire into the minds and intent of the 
actors. This standard essentially gives these individuals ex-
tremely wide latitude for error and misjudgment, since bad faith 
is very difficult to prove. Regarding insurance, Arizona's law 
requires that the charter of a school ensure "compliance with 
federal, state and local rules, regulations and statutes relating 
to health, safety, civil rights and insurance."65 
A second option for dealing with the issue of liability is that 
a legislature could allocate the responsibility of acquiring insur-
ance to the school directors or board of trustees of the school. In 
New Jersey, the legislature chose to allocate the responsibility 
for insurance to the board of trustees of each school. The statute 
first grants authority to the board of trustees of a charter school 
"to decide matters related to the operations of the school includ-
63. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-183(0) (Supp. 1997). 
64. Id. at § 15-183(P). 
65. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-183(E)(l). 
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ing budgeting, curriculum, and operating procedures, subject to 
the school's charter."66 Then the statute plainly states that the 
board must provide for the school to be properly insured: "the 
board shall provide for appropriate insurance against any loss or 
damage to its property or any liability resulting from the use of 
its property or from the acts or omissions of its officers and em-
ployees.'767 New Jersey's statute also deems the board of trustees 
of a charter school "public agents authorized by the State Board 
of Education to supervise and control the charter school,"68 and 
provides that a charter school can "sue and be sued, but only to 
the same extent and upon the same conditions that a public 
entity can be sued."69 
A third option is to adopt legislation that requires charter 
school applicants to provide specific insurance information to 
the district and to require the school to indemnify the district. 
For example, Wyoming's charter school statute requires that 
those who wish to start a charter school provide insurance infor-
mation to the district board of trustees: 
The district board shall require the petitioner to provide 
information regarding the proposed operation and poten-
tial effects of the school, including but not limited to the 
facilities to be utilized by the school, the manner in 
which administrative services of the school are to be 
provided and a demonstration that the school is ade-
quately insured for liability, including errors and omis-
sions, and that the school district is indemnified to the 
fullest extent possible. 70 
Wyoming's approach is to place the burden on the school spon-
sors, not only adequately insuring the school and indemnifying 
the school district, but the additional burden of making sure the 
district board is provided with information concerning the opera-
tion and administration of the school. 
A fourth option is to grant general governmental immunity 
to the school and extend tort immunity to those operating the 
school. This approach is seen in Massachusetts' law. First, the 
66. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-14(a) (West 1989). 
67. Id. at § 18A:36A-14(a). 
68. Id. at § 18A:36A-3(a). 
69. Id. at § 18A:36A-6(b). 
70. WYO. STAT. § 21-3-203(£) (Supp. 1996). 
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statute deems the board of trustees of a charter school to be 
"public agents authorized by the commonwealth to supervise 
and control the charter school."71 Next, the statute defines a 
charter school as a ''body politic and corporate" which can "sue 
and be sued, but only to the same extent and upon the same 
conditions that a town can be sued."72 The law further provides 
that, for purposes of tort liability, employees of charter schools 
be considered public employees and that the board of trustees be 
considered the public employer for the same purpose.73 
Yet another option, and perhaps the one most consistent 
with the policies behind charter schools, is for the legislature to 
let the parties decide how to allocate liability.74 For example, 
Colorado's law leaves the determination ofhow to allocate liabil-
ity up to an agreement between the charter school applicants 
and the local board of education. The law requires that charter 
school applicants enter into an agreement regarding their re-
spective legal liability and applicable insurance coverage. 75 
Thus, the allocation of liability will likely be the result of the 
relative bargaining power of each party to the contract. 
It is worth mentioning that other states have pursued cre-
ative options in allocating liability. For instance, New Hamp-
shire's Charter Schools and Open Enrollment Act contains a 
requirement that every charter include in its provisions certain 
elements, one of those elements being that of a "global hold-
harmless clause protecting the local school board, school district, 
and all funding districts and sources, and their successors and 
assigns from liability for any action or inaction of the charter 
school, its successors or assigns, or its board of trustees, employ-
71. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 89 (West 1996). 
72. ld. 
73. ld. 
74. The fundamental philosophy behind the charter movement is to allow 
individual schools freedom from the bureaucratic red-tape of school districts in exchange 
for greater accountability for educational results. These schools are free to experiment 
with educational innovations, including techniques, materials, and approaches. Each 
school may determine its own particular educational focus, and may choose to cater its 
educational services to drop-outs, gifted students, physically disabled students, students 
with particular subject interests, or any number of particular interests. Thus, allowing 
those individuals wishing to start up a charter school to enter the bargaining process 
and craft their contract according to the particular philosophy and design of the school 
is consistent with the inherently individual school philosophy of the charter reform 
movement. 
75. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-lOG(l)(j) (1995). 
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ees, contractors, agents, or pupils."76 Minnesota's law is likewise 
creative in how it deals with the issues of liability and insur-
ance. In Minnesota, charter schools are known as "results-ori-
ented schools," organized and operated either as a "cooperative" 
or as a "nonprofit corporation."77 The contract for one of these 
schools must contain a provision for assumption of liability by 
the school,78 and one that outlines the "types and amounts of 
insurance coverage to be obtained by the charter school. ... "79 
For the purposes of tort liability, however, the school is deemed 
a school district.80 The Minnesota statute also contains two in-
teresting provisions regarding those in authority. First, the 
board of directors of a charter school may sue and be sued.81 
Second, nearly everyone involved with the schools cannot be 
sued: 
The state board of education, members of the state board, a 
sponsor, members of the board of a sponsor in their official 
capacity, and employees of a sponsor are immune from civil or 
criminal liability with respect to all activities related to a char-
ter school they approve or sponsor. The board of directors shall 
obtain at least the amount of and types of insurance required 
by the contract, according to subdivision 5.82 
The Minnesota Legislature allocated liability to those with di-
rect control, and immunized those entities and individuals who 
have relinquished daily control over activities of the school. 
Michigan's law is more detailed than other states' laws, 
which could be the result of already having faced a constitu-
tional challenge. Michigan requires that a charter school have 
certain provisions in its contract, including "types and amounts 
of insurance coverage," and "legal remedies of the authorizing 
body and the state board, in addition to remedies under law, for 
substantial failure by the public school academy to meet its 
obligations under the contract."83 This remedy provision appears 
76. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:3(Il)(x) (Supp. 1997). 
77. MINN. STAT. § 120.064 (Subd. 4)(a) (Supp. 1998). 
78. Id. at § 120.064 (Subd. 5)(7). 
79. Id. at § 120.064 (Subd. 5)(8). 
80. ld. at § 120.064 (Subd. 8)(j) ("The school is a school district for the purposes 
of tort liability under chapter 466."). 
81. ld. at § 120.064 (Subd. 23). 
82. MINN. STAT. at § 120.064 (Subd. 24). 
83. MICH. STAT. ANN. §380.513 (6)(i)-(j) (West. 1996). 
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to be unique to Michigan's law. Equally noteworthy is Michi-
gan's wide grant of immunity to those involved with a charter 
school on various levels: 
A public school academy and its incorporators, board 
members, officers, employees, and volunteers have gov-
ernmental immunity as provided [by Michigan law]. An 
authorizing body and its board members, officers, and 
employees are immune from civil liability, both person-
ally and professionally, for any acts or omissions in au-
thorizing a public school academy if the authorizing body 
or the person acted or reasonably believed he or she 
acted within the authorizing body's or the person's scope 
of authority.84 
Most notable perhaps, are those states which do not cover 
the issues of liability or insurance in their charter school stat-
utes. Interestingly, California did not include a provision provid-
ing for the allocation of liability, nor one requiring the issue to 
be determined in the terms of a charter. Given the number of 
charter schools currently operating in California,85 the absence 
of such a clause should be troubling. The charter school system, 
because it is based on principles of choice and autonomy, creates 
an educational framework in which mistakes can and will occa-
sionally be made, and thus, provisions covering the issue of lia-
bility not only seem wise, but necessary. The statute does, how-
ever, provide that "the governing board may require that the 
petitioner or petitioners provide information regarding the pro-
posed operation and potential effects of the school, including, but 
not limited to, the ... potential civil liability effects upon the 
school and upon the school district."86 Given the very real possi-
bility that some schools will fail to meet the state's standards, a 
permissive rather than mandatory provision covering liability is 
inherently inadequate. 
New Mexico's Charter Schools Act is also noteworthy for its 
lack of terms addressing liability or immunity. This may be be-
cause the statute provides that only individual schools within a 
84. MICH. STAT. ANN. §380.513(10). 
85. As of early 1997, California had 109 charter schools operating. Education 
Reform: A Charter For Success?, STATE TRENDS, (The Council of State Governments), 
Winter 1997, at 1. 
86. CAL. Eouc. CODE § 47605(g) (West Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). 
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school district may be authorized by the state board to imple-
ment an "alternative educational curriculum,"87 which means 
that only existing public schools may apply for and receive char-
ter status. Like New Mexico, Georgia's charter school law is 
silent on the entire issue ofliability, immunity, and insurance.88 
This may be because the structure of Georgia's law, like New 
Mexico's, is characterized as a weak law, meaning that it grants 
little autonomy to charter schools. The statutory scheme sup-
ports the idea that the schools, for liability purposes, are to be 
treated just like public schools, and depending on how govern-
mental immunity has developed in Georgia, these schools are 
probably immune. Hawaii's treatment ofliability is the same as 
Georgia's-the enabling charter school legislation ("student-
centered schools") includes nothing about liability, immunity, 
insurance or indemnification.89 
V. REVOCATION PROCEDURES IN CHARTER SCHOOL LEGISLATION 
An important issue involved in the establishment of charter 
schools is whether the provisions of the charter legislation pro-
vide for specific procedures in the case of a school's failure. 90 The 
question could be framed in this manner: if a charter school 
were to have its charter revoked and be subsequently shut 
down, what would happen to those students who were enrolled 
in the charter school? Supposedly, if the charter is revoked at 
the end of a school year (in the form of non-renewal), then the 
parents and students would have enough time to re-enroll in the 
regular public school system. Likewise, the school district would 
have advance notice of the returning students, and could struc-
ture class sizes and teacher work loads accordingly. On the other 
hand, if the charter has been revoked mid-year, what becomes of 
those students and teachers who are displaced as a result ofthe 
closure? 
87. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8A-2(A) (Michie 1993). 
88. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-255 (Harrison 1997). 
89. HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 302A-101 (Supp. 1996). 
90. Failure as a valid possibility is perhaps most logically inferred from the 
marketplace nature of school choice reform movements, of which the charter school is 
a subset. As one commentator has noted, "a true free market for education, like any 
other market, requires a threat of failure; otherwise, competition will not push schools 
to improve the quality of their educational services." The Limits of Choice: School 
Choice Reform and State Constitutional Guarantees of Educational Quality, 109 HARv. 
L. REV. 2002 (1996). 
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The statutes vary in how they address the grounds to revoke 
a charter mid-year. Some statutes, like Arizona's, indicate that 
the sponsor of a charter school (a school district governing 
board, the state board of education, or the state board for char-
ter schools) "shall establish procedures to conduct administra-
tive hearings upon determination by the sponsor that grounds 
exist to revoke a charter" and further provides for judicial re-
view of final decisions.91 However, the standard approach is to 
list the grounds for revocation in the statute. The grounds are 
essentially four-fold: 1) a material violation of provisions of the 
charter, 2) a failure to meet or make reasonable progress toward 
the educational objectives contained in the charter, 3) a failure 
to comply with fiscal accountability procedures or generally 
accepted standards of fiscal management, or 4) a violation of any 
laws that have not been expressly waived or exempted by the 
charter.92 As a general rule, it appears that statutes do not dif-
ferentiate between mid-year and end of the year revocation. At 
least one state, New Hampshire, has however, written into its 
law a provision that allows the state board to "immediately" 
revoke a school's charter "in circumstances posing extraordinary 
risk ofharm to pupils."93 
If the charter school were previously a regular public school, 
it seems likely that the school, after losing its charter, could con-
tinue to operate as a school within the district, and without 
closing its doors, be subjected once again to all of the rules and 
91. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-183(R) (1991). Similarly, Massachusetts' statute 
provides that the "secretary of education may revoke a school's charter if the school has 
not fulfilled any conditions imposed by the secretary of education in connection with the 
grant of the charter or the school has violated any provision of its charter." MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 89 (West 1996). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-17 (West 
1989). 
92. The statutory language of California's, Colorado's and Kansas' revocation 
provisions represent the typical grounds for revocation. See CAL. Enuc. CODE 
§ 47607(b)(l)-(4) (West 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. § 22-30.5-110(3)(a)-(d) (1995); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 72-1907(a)(l)-(4) (Supp. 1996). Minnesota's statute lists the following four 
grounds for terminating a contract: "1) failure to meet the requirements for pupil 
performance contained in the contract; 2) failure to meet generally accepted standards 
of fiscal management; 3) for violations of law; or 4) other good cause shown." MINN. 
STAT. § 120.064(Subd. 21)(b) (Supp. 1998). Again, Minnesota's revocation section does 
not differentiate between mid-year and end of the year revocation. However, the 
Minnesota law does provide that if a contract is terminated or not renewed, the school 
shall be dissolved according to the applicable provisions of chapter 308A or 317 A 
[Cooperatives or Nonprofit Corporations]." ld. 
93. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:16(V) (Supp. 1997). 
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regulations it had gained freedom from under the charter agree-
ment. The magnitude of the transition mid-year would depend 
on how closely the charter school resembled its non-charter form 
and organization. Additionally, the ease of returning to regular 
public school status would depend on how recently the school 
had converted to charter status. Theoretically, if the school had 
existed as a public school before becoming a charter school and 
not too much time had passed since the conversion, then a re-
turn to public school status would pose fewer difficulties than if 
the school had been created anew under charter legislation or 
had undergone a major transformation in becoming a charter 
school. 
Some states allow charter schools to be formed from previous 
private schools or to be completely new schools. 94 If these schools 
face a charter revocation mid-year, then the school district's 
difficulties of providing displaced students with a school to finish 
out the year become greater, unless a plan is in place. Similar 
concerns over unemployed teachers surface with mid-year revo-
cation. Districts may have to scramble to fit the students into 
their schools, money may not be available to provide necessary 
room and resources, and openings may not be available for mid-
year employment. Who should take the risk or carry the burden 
of reallocation of teachers and students is a question that must 
be anticipated and adequately addressed in charter school legis-
lation. 
A related question may be asked at this point: is it the re-
sponsibility of the state to see that those children still receive an 
education? From a policy standpoint, a state which has dele-
gated its responsibility to individual charter school directors to 
provide the children of the state with a free, public education 
should feel at least some obligation to step in and assist a failing 
schooJ.95 The question then becomes, would a state have a legal 
responsibility to provide an education for those students, or at 
least provide an opportunity for those students to receive an 
94. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-183(A) (1991). 
95. For a discussion of how state constitutional education clauses constitute a 
possible legal source of restriction on school choice reform efforts in the event of school 
failure, see The Limits of Choice: School Choice Reform and State Constitutional 
Guarantees of Educational Quality, 109 HARV. L. REv. 2002, 2003 (1996) (arguing that 
"in many states, constitutional guarantees of adequate educational quality would indeed 
prohibit school choice reforms that allowed such school failures."). 
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education?96 The state arguably has a legal obligation, if it closes 
down the school, as the entity ultimately responsible for main-
taining and controlling a system of free public education, to 
bring those students back into the traditional public school sys-
tem, even if it means placing students in already-full classes 
mid-year without funding allocated for those students. To avoid 
this problem, statutory provisions could provide that the funds 
allocated to the charter school for the remainder of the year 
follow the student back into that particular school (or those par-
ticular schools) that absorbed the displaced students. Obviously, 
this puts some of the risk of failure directly on the state, and 
while this may initially appear undesirable, it may have the 
effect of encouraging a state sponsoring entity to do everything 
in its power to help the charter school meet its contractual and 
financial obligations and educational goals. On the flip side, it 
places the burden of reabsorbing the students on an entity that 
is not directly responsible for the failure. 
A. Possible Statutory Solutions to Revocation Concerns 
States have, to a varying extent, dealt with the issue of revo-
cation in their charters. While statutes almost universally out-
line the various circumstances under which a charter may be 
revoked, they much less frequently state how the various partic-
ipants are to proceed once a charter has been revoked. Despite 
this lack of attention, some options exist,97 and states should 
carefully design their revocation procedures and options in har-
mony with state constitutional standards. 
96. The constitutions of all fifty states contain clauses that charge the state with 
the responsibility to provide public education. For a complete list, see Allen W. Hubsch, 
The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 
1325, 1343-48 (1992). At least thirteen states have had their educational systems 
adjudged as invalid under these clauses. For a comprehensive citation of these cases, 
and a thorough discussion of the issue of education clause litigation, see The Limits of 
Choice: School Choice Reform and State Constitutional Guarantees of Educational 
Quality, supra note 96 at 2010 (concluding that state court decisions invalidating state 
educational systems tend to share common elements, such as a focus on quality and 
adequacy, and whether the state has provided an adequate education for all students 
attending public school). 
97. For a thorough discussion of various legislative remedies in a scholarly and 
theoretical presentation, see The Limits of Choice: School Choice Reform and State 
Constitutional Guarantees of Educational Quality, 109 HARV. L. REV. at 2017. The 
author argues that "every school choice reform should provide for the automatic closing 
or state take-over of schools that fail to meet minimum quality standards." 
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One option is to allow the contracting parties to set the 
terms of revocation and procedure in their contract. Kansas 
includes, in its charter, legislation a requirement that the char-
ter contain a provision specifYing "the manner in which con-
tracts of employment and status of certified employees of the 
district who participate in the operation of the [charter] school 
will be dealt with upon non-renewal or revocation of the charter 
or upon a decision by any such employees to discontinue partici-
pation in the operation of the school."98 While the statute does 
not specify what details should be included, it does mandate 
that the petitioners and the board of education of a school dis-
trict address the issue. No similar provision specifically men-
tions what is to happen to the displaced students. In fact, the 
section covering renewal or revocation charters does not seem to 
contemplate a mid-year revocation. The language seems to refer 
specifically to the decision of the board of education to either 
renew or revoke the charter at the end of the initial three-year 
period.99 However, a subsequent section requires that the board 
of education decide whether to revoke a charter school's charter 
within sixty days of a hearing on the matter. 100 
Another option is to grant to the state entity over education 
the authority to set statewide procedures to govern the revoca-
tion process. New Jersey's statute requires that the Commis-
sioner of Education develop guidelines and procedures to govern 
the possibility of revocation of a school's charter. 101 Hopefully 
this would include guidelines concerning procedures for students 
who are displaced because of a revocation. 
A third option is to have the statute itself provide the proce-
dure for educating students whose charter school has failed or 
had its charter revoked. New Hampshire provides that if a char-
ter is revoked or expires, "the parent of a pupil attending that 
school may apply to any other charter or open enrollment school 
eligible to receive tuition under the provisions of this chapter 
adopted by the school district." The statute then continues by 
explicitly stating that "the pupil's sending district shall not be 
relieved ofits obligation to educate that pupil in accordance with 
98. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1906(c)(13) (Supp. 1996). 
99. ld. at § 72-1907(a). 
100. ld. at § 72-1907(b) (Supp. 1996). 
101. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-17 (West Supp. 1997). 
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the district's policies."102 "Sending district" is defined in a previ-
ous section as the "school district in which the pupil resides."103 
The responsibility to educate those students affected by a deci-
sion to revoke a charter remains with the school district which 
originally had the responsibility. 
Minnesota's charter school statute, like New Hampshire's, 
provides the procedures for determining who has the responsi-
bility for educating displaced charter school students. If a 
school's contract is not renewed or is terminated, "a pupil who 
attended the school, siblings of the pupil, or another pupil who 
resides in the same place as the pupil may enroll in the resident 
district or may submit an application to a nonresident district 
according to section 120.062 [Enrollment Options Program] at 
any time."104 Furthermore, the statute requires that applications 
and notices be "processed and provided in a prompt manner."105 
Thus, the district in which the charter school is located has the 
duty to accept that student back into the district school system 
in the event of a revocation of a charter school's contract. 
Of the states researched/06 most were silent on how students 
are to be educated after their charter school's contract has been 
revoked. For example, of the statutes examined, charter school 
statutes from Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Wyoming did not have provi-
sions outlining a plan to immerse students back into the regular 
public school system. 
102. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:16(VIII) (Supp. 1997). 
103. Id. at § 194-B:1(Xll) (Supp. 1997). 
104. MlNN. STAT. § 120.064(Subd. 22) (Supp. 1998). 
105. ld. 
106. See supra note 63. 
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VI. EXPANDING THEORIES OF EDUCATIONAL LIABILITY107 
Every states constitution contains a clause establishing edu-
cation as one of the state's responsibilities, 108 and the constitu-
tions of forty-eight states clearly establish a mandatory duty to 
provide education to the children within its reach. 109 Even so, in 
the past, educational claims typically based their arguments on 
the Federal Constitution and litigated issues in federal court. 
However, federal precedent made it difficult for plaintiffs to 
succeed on these claims,110 and as a result, plaintiffs increas-
ingly have brought their claims in state courts and have called 
for interpretations of state constitutional law.m State courts, 
faced with issues of first impression and inexperienced in decid-
ing educational issues, grope for theories and principles to guide 
their decisions. 112 
In the case of charter schools, the trend toward state consti-
tutional interpretation should be troubling. The charter concept 
itself, which proposes a partnership between independent school 
directors and the state, on the basis of a contract or formal 
agreement, may very well have the effect of compounding the 
trend toward litigating questions of educational responsibility 
and quality. 
At least one commentator has contemplated the issue of 
whether a state's constitutional education clause should apply to 
school choice reforms, such as the charter school: 
107. The educational reform context in which charter schools operate is the context 
of the marketplace. For an interesting take on the potential abuses of charter schools, 
see Mary L. Whitezell, Charter Schools Can Be a Guise for a Corporation to Siphon 
Profits, PITr. POST-GAZE'ITE, Aug. 13, 1995, at E2; See also, Lewis D. Solomon, The Role 
of For-Profit Corporations in Revitalizing Public Education: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 
24 U. TOL. L. REV. 883, 886 (1993). For a thorough explanation of the theory of 
privatization of public schools and its implications, see Myron Lieberman, PRivATIZATION 
AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE (1989); See also Kimberly Colonna, The Privatization of Public 
Schools-A Statutory and Constitutional Analysis in the Context of the Wilkinsburg 
Education Association v. Wilkinsburg School District, 100 DICK. L. REV. 1027 (Summer 
1996) (focusing on the state constitutional and state statutory issues raised by 
privatization.). 
108. Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education 
Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & Enuc. 93, 96-97 (1989). 
109. Vermont and Minnesota are the exceptions to the mandatory language. ld. at 
97. 
110. Hubsch, supra note 109, at 103-04. 
111. ld. at 115, 127-33. 
112. Id. at 94 ("[S)ometimes, state courts have groped about dizzily in the recent 
education litigation, as if exposed to strong sunlight after a long period in the dark."). 
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It seems unlikely that an education clause would provide 
relief for at-risk students in a state whose courts had 
previously rejected constitutional challenges to the 
state's educational system. The possibility that school 
choice might exacerbate inequality and cause more pub-
lic schools to offer inadequate education might, however, 
prompt more successful state constitutional challenges; a 
state court would have good reason to reassess its inter-
pretation of the state's education clause when the state 
legislature has enacted a choice policy that is intended to 
let deficient schools fail. 113 
Although a school system that allows individual administrators, 
teachers and parents to exercise choice over particular educa-
tional matters is fundamentally different from a traditional, 
state-operated public school system, constitutional education 
clauses are certainly broad enough to support a challenge on the 
basis that a state has failed in its constitutional obligation to 
provide an adequate education. The argument that students in a 
school choice program can merely switch to a better school 
would likely not excuse the state from its constitutional respon-
sibilities.114 
In addition to claims based on state constitutional education 
clauses, contractual theories of liability may prove useful to 
charter school litigants. In his article entitled "Contract Law: 
The Proper Framework for Litigating Educational Liability 
Claims," Kevin McJessy explores how contract law principles 
could be used to support claims against educational institu-
tions.U5 McJessy first provides an overview of the various tradi-
tional legal theories advanced by claimants and then shows how 
contract principles may assist litigators in establishing educa-
113. The Limits of Choice: School Choice Reform and State Constitutional 
Guarantees of Educational Quality, 109 HARv. L. REV. 2002, 2013 (1996). This statement 
is particularly troubling given the following comment by the "experts" of charter schools: 
"Some charter schools will fail and close or be closed. This is a plus for educational 
accountability and a model for public education generally." Chester E. Finn, Jr., et al, 
Charter Schools in Action: What Have We Learned, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, The Hudson 
Institute, July 1996. 
114. The Limits of Choice: School Choice Reform and State Constitutional 
Guarantees of Educational Quality, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 2002, 2014. 
115. Kevin P. McJessy, Contract Law: The Proper Framework for Litigating 
Educational Liability Claims, 89 Nw. U. L. REV., 1768, 1774 (1995). 
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tional liability on the part of school directors. Specifically, the 
article proposes that the principles of contract law would allow 
courts to "hold educational institutions legally accountable for 
the actions of their employees without triggering the concerns 
that induce courts to dismiss such claims based on the doctrine 
of academic abstention."116 
McJessy proposes six reasons why courts and litigants 
should more seriously consider contract law as a method for 
substantiating educational liability claims: 
First, both legal commentators and the courts have thus 
far inappropriately given too little consideration to the 
propriety of such [contractual] claims. Second, contract 
principles avoid the concerns that induce courts to apply 
the doctrine of academic abstention. Third, the emerging 
student-school relationship is one particularly amenable 
to an application of contract principles. Fourth, courts 
have so widely rejected other theories of educational 
liability that contract law may provide the last hope for 
potential plaintiffs. Fifth, educational liability actions 
comport with the goal of contract law: to protect parties' 
reasonable expectations. Finally, contract theory has 
already met with limited success; consequently plaintiffs 
would not be asking courts to make new law but to take 
the lesser step of expanding existing law. 117 
In particular, McJessy notes the growing trend in education to-
ward a market-oriented service in which students and their 
parents are the consumers and schools are the producers.U8 Al-
though he does not explicitly mention charter schools, these 
116. McJessy at 1769. 
117. /d. at 1784. 
118. As the concept of education changes, so does the rhetoric used to describe 
education and schools. Take for example the following language, which echoes the 
language of other deregulation movements in various other service industries: 
The monopoly in public schools is breaking up. Competition is bringing 
experiments and forcing assumptions to change. Even some people in the 
teacher's unions and on school boards are starting to embrace the charter-
school idea .... The school boards, traditionally just suppliers of education 
services, have the opportunity to become purchasers on behalf of the citizens 
they serve, and to think afresh about the sort of education they ought to be 
buying. Charter Schools Free at Last, THE ECONOMIST, July 2, 1994, at 31. 
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schools are clearly vulnerable to a contract theory of liability. 119 
Specifically, McJessy mentions three main contract theories 
upon which liability could be based: breach of an express con-
tract claim, promissory estoppel, and third-party beneficiary 
claim.I2o 
McJessy's assertions should be of concern to educators, edu-
cational institutions, and state entities, for if the ideas ex-
pressed prove prophetic, the educational landscape may be for-
ever changed. For charter schools, the newest players in educa-
tional reform, educational liability theories pose an even greater 
threat because the essence of these schools is their exchange of 
freedom from regulation for greater accountability, outlined in 
express "contract" form. Although the charter is not a contract 
between the student and the school, but exists, rather, between 
the school and a sponsoring board, the student could nonethe-
less arguably qualify as a third-party beneficiary. Under this 
type of claim, the plaintiff would argue that she was the benefi-
ciary of the contract between the charter school's sponsoring 
entity and the school directors. She would then allege that the 
school failed to meet, or violated, the terms of that contract. As a 
consequence of a breach of contract, parents would be entitled to 
maintain a third-party action against the teachers, and through 
respondeat superior, against the schools.121 Thus, even if charter 
schools are deemed "arms of the state" and are treated as public 
schools, under a contract theory of liability, they may find them-
selves in a legal quandary. 
The conclusion of the article is that courts should be willing 
to adopt contract theories in considering educational liability 
claims. Looking at the movements at the forefront of educational 
119. As explained supra Part I, charter schools are independent public schools that 
operate on the basis of a contract with the local, county, or state school board, which 
sponsors the school and groups that organize and manage the school. The charter 
specifies particular aspects of the school such as the school's educational plan, expected 
outcomes, measurement procedures, and compliance provisions with other state and 
federal laws. The essential theory is that charter schools will continue to receive public 
money, will opt out of rigid state regulations, and through innovative educational 
techniques and specialization, succeed in delivering an education at least as adequate, 
if not more, than that offered by the traditional public school system. See, e.g., 
Education Reform: A Charter For Success? STATE TRENDS: CRITICAL ISSUES, EMERGING 
TRENDS AND BEST PRACTICES IN STATE GoVERNMENT, (The Council of State 
Governments), Winter 1997, at 1-3. 
120. McJessy, supra note 115, at 1788-1810. 
121. Id. at 1808. 
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liability, educators and legislators would be wise to carefully 
consider the extent and type of accountability they may be in-
curring in exchange for granting precious freedom from state 
regulation. This is particularly true if contract law proves suc-
cessful with the courts, combined with the real potential for 
litigation based on state constitutional interpretations of the 
education clauses and charter schools. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The establishment of charter schools within the public edu-
cation system involves legal issues that should be considered 
carefully. Some of these issues involve constitutional concerns, 
while others are issues of statutory construction and state pol-
icy. The statutes of the various states which have ventured into 
the charter school arena show that the solutions to these legal 
issues are numerous and diverse. Legislation also shows that 
the legal issues have not always been adequately addressed. 
The general consensus among commentators and educators 
is that the charter school movement will continue to gain legiti-
macy and achieve results. Its rapid growth from one state in 
1991 to twenty-five in 1997 shows that charter reform is not 
likely to die out any time soon. The early consensus of the im-
pact of the charter reform movement is that at least now there 
exists a viable third alternative to the traditional public 
schooVprivate school system. However, since the movement is so 
new, and because of the lack of longitudinal studies regarding 
their effectiveness, charter schools may not be the educational 
panacea hoped for by its most ardent advocates. 
The experiences of the few states which have faced litigation 
over their charter school laws and the possibility of a change in 
educational liability theories show that a legislature would be 
wise to proceed carefully in creating a system of public schools 
relinquished from the control of the state board of education or 
other responsible state entity. Since the real effects of the school 
choice reform movement, and charter schools in particular, are 
yet unknown, legislatures would be wise to proceed carefully 
lest by adopting choice programs, they jeopardize the education 
of many of the nation's children. Those states still contemplating 
the charter school idea as a means of jump-starting their educa-
tional environment, or as a way of offering viable alternatives to 
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parents, would be wise to look to the experiences of other states 
in dealing with the legal issues involved. Perhaps by learning 
from one another, from legislation, and subsequently, from char-
ter schools, the effectiveness of the American educational system 
will improve. 
